Strengthening the European Commission’s Budgetary and Economic Surveillance Capacity Since Greece and the Euro Crisis: A Study of Five Directorates-General Jan 01, 2016 By James SavageAmy Verdun Strengthening the European Commission’s Budgetary and Economic Surveillance Capacity Since Greece and the Euro Crisis: A Study of Five Directorates-General Journal of European Public Policy Journal of European Public Policy James Savage James D. Savage is a professor of politics and public policy at the Batten School and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. His research and teaching focus on comparative budgetary, fiscal, and macroeconomic policy, with an emphasis on the United States, the European Union, Iraq and Japan. He is particularly interested in the development of macrobudgetary rules, procedures, and institutions in these countries, and how they influence fiscal outcomes. Read full bio Amy Verdun Related Content James Savage The Administrative Costs of Congressional Earmarking: The Case of the Office of Naval Research Research Discussions about congressional earmarking often focus on their direct costs in the federal government’s appropriations bills. This article shows that this conventional view neglects the administrative costs of earmarking by examining the extensive transaction and opportunity costs that come with the political, budgetary, and programmatic management of these earmarked projects in Congress and in the Office of Naval Research. Reconstructing Iraq’s Budgetary Institutions: Coalition State Building after Saddam Research
James Savage James D. Savage is a professor of politics and public policy at the Batten School and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. His research and teaching focus on comparative budgetary, fiscal, and macroeconomic policy, with an emphasis on the United States, the European Union, Iraq and Japan. He is particularly interested in the development of macrobudgetary rules, procedures, and institutions in these countries, and how they influence fiscal outcomes. Read full bio
The Administrative Costs of Congressional Earmarking: The Case of the Office of Naval Research Research Discussions about congressional earmarking often focus on their direct costs in the federal government’s appropriations bills. This article shows that this conventional view neglects the administrative costs of earmarking by examining the extensive transaction and opportunity costs that come with the political, budgetary, and programmatic management of these earmarked projects in Congress and in the Office of Naval Research.