Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions Research We examine how a foresighted legislative chamber will design its institutions in response to ex ante incentives for universalism and ex post incentives for minimum winning coalitions and what coalitions will form as a result. To do so, we develop a model of vote trading with an endogenous voting rule and coalition formation process.
Asymmetric Effects of Intergovernmental Grants: Analysis and Implications for U.S. Welfare Policy Research Theories of federal grants to states and localities suggest that these grants have a stimulative effect on spending, causing recipient governments to expand and contract programs along with changes in the grants. However, policymakers may respond differently to grant decreases than to grant increases because they face political and bureaucratic pressures to expand programs.
Sophisticated Voting in Supermajoritarian Settings Research Empirical support for sophisticated voting in the legislative setting has been sparse. This is due to a number of factors, including the difficulty of identifying the ideal points of legislators in multidimensional spaces.