About News Potter: The Death and Life of Terrorist Networks Oct 06, 2020 Christopher Blair, Erica Chenoweth, Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B. K. Potter Potter: The Death and Life of Terrorist Networks How Alliances Help Militants Survive ISIS fighters in Raqqa, Syria, June 2014The Islamic State (or ISIS) is quietly “rising from the ashes” in parts of Iraq and Syria, but this is not the first time that it has recovered from a near-death experience. Its predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, also reconstituted itself after nearly being defeated in 2007–8. ISIS has demonstrated extraordinary resilience; about half of all terrorist organizations fail in their first year, but it has survived for the better part of two decades despite fighting against an international coalition assembled to defeat it. This resilience may seem surprising, but it should not. Over recent decades, militant groups with the kind of vast international network of affiliates, allies, and supporters that ISIS has assembled have proved difficult to defeat. Alliances have helped ISIS expand and gain influence in good times and have relieved pressure by deflecting attention toward affiliates in bad times. Without defeating this whole network, accordingly, it will be hard to fully finish off the core group. The value of alliances in geopolitical competition between states has been frequently noted in the past few years. It turns out alliances are just as important to often-stateless militant groups. The difference between a terrorist group with ideologically aligned allies and a terrorist group without them can mean the difference between survival and defeat—as the ongoing fight to destroy ISIS is making all too clear today. BELIEVERS IN ARMS In an analysis of militant group behavior over the past 70 years, we compiled every known alliance between armed groups since 1950. Using an extensive array of open-source information, we identified the incidence, location, and content of cooperative relationships. Were groups sharing equipment and materiel or exchanging funds? Were they coordinating attacks? Or was cooperation merely rhetorical, involving pledges and other public statements but little in the way of physical exchange? The resulting data—the most comprehensive account available of worldwide networks of terrorist, rebel, and insurgent organizations—reveal several important patterns. First, between 1950 and 2016, militant groups developed much broader networks than is commonly appreciated. We have identified nearly 15,000 instances of cooperation between 2,613 different armed organizations, undercutting the common belief that armed groups operate primarily in isolation. Second, these networks have become more extensive over time, increasing in number but also in geographic breadth. The number of active alliances grew steadily from the late 1960s through the early 1980s, going from just under 50 to nearly 175, corresponding with a wave of European decolonization and the rise of communist movements in Western Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. After a brief lull in the late 1980s, alliances surged again until reaching a peak around 2010. Linkages among armed Islamist groups, many of them motivated by the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, dominated this latter wave. Many involved the exchange of tangible goods, such as guns, explosives, and other equipment, and efforts to help armed groups smuggle resources into Afghanistan and Iraq to sustain their fight against coalition forces. READ FULL ARTICLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS Philip Potter Philip Potter is an Associate Professor specializing in foreign policy and international relations. He also conducts research in the area of international terrorism and is a principal investigator for a Department of Defense Minerva Initiative project to map and analyze collaborative relationships between terrorist organizations. Read full bio Related Content Philip Potter Direct Election and the Foreign Policy President News Since the 9-11 attacks, it has become increasingly clear that the congressional role in US foreign policy, particularly in matters of war and peace, has faded to virtually nothing. Batten's Phil Potter, Associate Professor of Politics and Public Policy and Director of the National Security Policy Center, elaborates. The High Costs of a Precipitous US Withdrawal from Afghanistan News Batten’s Phil Potter and co-authors discuss how America’s war in Afghanistan — the longest conflict in U.S. history — has morphed from a counterterrorism mission into something more ambitious but less well defined and, ultimately, less successful. Stay Up To Date with the Latest Batten News and Events Subscribe
Philip Potter Philip Potter is an Associate Professor specializing in foreign policy and international relations. He also conducts research in the area of international terrorism and is a principal investigator for a Department of Defense Minerva Initiative project to map and analyze collaborative relationships between terrorist organizations. Read full bio
Direct Election and the Foreign Policy President News Since the 9-11 attacks, it has become increasingly clear that the congressional role in US foreign policy, particularly in matters of war and peace, has faded to virtually nothing. Batten's Phil Potter, Associate Professor of Politics and Public Policy and Director of the National Security Policy Center, elaborates.
The High Costs of a Precipitous US Withdrawal from Afghanistan News Batten’s Phil Potter and co-authors discuss how America’s war in Afghanistan — the longest conflict in U.S. history — has morphed from a counterterrorism mission into something more ambitious but less well defined and, ultimately, less successful.